So instead of doing the grant proposal due tomorrow, I have written my five page summary of cable market power and its implications for media policy. Called, at present "Harold's Really Simple Stupid Cable Competition Calculations (or why lawyers should not try to do economics)" it explains in simple terms and equations why a) cable comapnies can raise rates despite theeoretical competition from satellite; b) why cable companies can favor affiliated programming over "better" unaffiliated programming without worrying about it; and c) what public policies are necessary to produce a genuinely competitive cable market. Will probably post on my professional blog when it is actually done.
Here is the central equation for them what are curious:
The Switching Equation
V(i)-C(i)<V(n)-SC-C(n) Where V(i) is the value of the incumbent service, C(i) is the monetary cost of the service, V(n) is the value of the competing (new) service, SC is the switching cost, and C(n) is the monetary cost of the new service. Don't worry, it gets explained in the paper. Next projects: 1) Why the "unitary executive" theory has no basis in the structure of the Constitution and is contrary to the 14th Amendment du process clause, and would reverse over 100 years of settled administrative law: Hamilton lost! Deal with it and move on! 2) Network valuation differences between network operators and network users: the inevitable conflict (as a matter of game theory, the interest of a monopoly network operator is divergent from that of network users, demonstrably from game theory. Accordingly, to achieve the full social utility of the network, it is necessary ether to create competing networks or impose regulation to harmonize the incentive structure and mximize economic and social utility of the network.) Except, of course, I'm too busy fundraising for the revolution and filing at the FCC. Ah well, back to work. LEt me know if you want a copy of the finished product.